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Snyder: Constitutional Law--Legislative Regulation of Fees Charged by Emp
RECENT CASE COMMENTS
celeration provisions were construed to give the holder an option"
to declare the maturity of all the notes. Let us suppose after default in the payment of one note, the holder transferred all the
notes to a purchaser, who, as in the other cases herein discussed,
knew of the default, but had no actual knowledge of a defect or
infirmity in the notes. Quaere: Should the purchaser be treated
as a holder in due course as to the balance of the notes? This
action by the transferor would indicate an election not to insist
on his cause of action, but to sell thie notes. But could not the
purchaser still reasonably think such election was caused by the
inability of the maker to pay, rendering immediate suit useless, as
well as by the existence of a defect or infirmity in the notes? It is
submitted that the question raised differs so slightly from the one
presented in Morgan v. Farmington Coal & Coke Company" that
under the NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS LAW' it should be treated the
same.
-DAvID G. LILLY, JR.

CONSTITUTIONAL

LAw-LEGISLATIVE

REGULATION

OF

FEES

CHARGED BY EMPLOYMENT AGENCIES.-A federal court has recently

held a Missouri statute fixing the maximum registration fee that
employment agencies may charge for their services to be void and
The court reasons
contrary to the Fourteenth Amendment.'
that it is bound by the decision of the Supreme Court of the United
States in Ribnik v. McBride,' in which the Court split, six to
three, on legislation also construed to fix fees charged by employYet the intimation
ment agencies and held the statute invalid.'
of the court in Bradford v. Hargis is sympathetic to the dissenting
view of Ribnik v. McBride.
The need for employment agency regulations seems apparent.
Many state statutes have attempted it to various extents.'
26 Ibid. 767.
17Supra n. 3.
' NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS LAw, § 56.

"Bradford v. Hargis, 45 F(2d) 223 (D. C., W. D. Mo. 1931).
2 Ribnik v. McBride, 277 U. S. 350, 48 S. Ct. 545 (1927).
3 The majority of the Court, composed of Chief Justice Taft and Justices
Sanford, Sutherland, MeReynolds, VanDevanter and Butler, decided the
statute in question was void. The dissenters were Justices Brandeis, Holmes
and Stone.
I See Hamilton, The Regulation of Employment Agencies (1930) 38 YALE
L. J. 225, 229. Also see, Statistics of Unemployment and the Work of the
Employment Offices (U. S. Bureau of Labor 1913) Bull. No. 109, 35-36.
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California appears to be the only state in which such legislative
price-fixing regulations have been declared unconstitutional.'
Mr.
Various investigations have clearly recommended it.'
Justice Stone, dissenting along with Mr. Justice Brandeis and Mr.
Justice Holmes in the Ribnik case, very forcibly shows this.'
Yet the majority of the Court then and there refused to regard
these factors as a sufficient persuasive force to justify price fixing
as a regulation. Since 1927 and the decision in Ribnik v. McBride,
however, the personnel of the Supreme Court has changed; s
the present Supreme Court is anticipated to be both liberal and
Recent decisions reveal a tendency of this
social minded.9
On a recent question
legislation.'
price-fixing
Court to allow
of social policy, the Court split, five to four, the majority favoring
the adoption of a liberal policy toward price-fixing legislation.'
This trend of the Supreme Court might cause it to employ
some other device than the rule announced in Ribnk v. McBride
in order to reach a contrary conclusion to the present decision in
Bradford v. Hargis. This could be easily accomplished.
The Supreme Court has always permitted price regulation and
control of businesses by legislation in times of emergencies when
The
such legislation might have been bad at other times.'
effect of the present economic depression, assuming, as it has, such
tremendous proportions, can easily be considered to render the
problem an emergency justifying price regulation. This being so,
and the employment agency business being so interrelated and
rEx parte Dickey, 144 Cal. 234, 77 Pac. 924 (1904) ; In re Smith, 193 Cal.
337, 223 Pac. 971 (1924).
GReport of the Commission on Industrial Relations, Sen. Doe. No. 415
64th Cong., 1st Sess. Vols. 1 & 2. Ninth Annual Convention of the Association of Governmental Labor Officials (1923).
7277 U. S. 350, 370-372 (1927).
8Chief Justice Hughes has replaced Chief Justice Taft and Mr. Justice
Roberts has taken the place of Mr. Justice Sanford.
OSee Fordham, The Present Supreme Court, Social Legislation and The
Judicial Process (1931) 37 W. VA. L. Q. 167, 207; Hardman, Public Utilities,
I. The Quest for a Concept (1931) 37 W. VA. L. Q. 250.
Tagg Bros. & Moorhead v. U. S., 280 U. S. 420, 50 S. Ct. 220 (1930).
(Holding statute providing for the prices to be charged by market agents in
stockyards not unconstitutional.)
nO'Gorman & Young v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 51 S. Ct. 130, 74 L. Ed.
287 (1931). (Holding statute regulating commissions on insurance policies
to a reasonable amount, not to exceed that paid to local agents, did not violate
the 14th Amendment. The majority was composed of Chief Justice Hughes
and Justices Brandeis, Holmes, Stone and Roberts. The minority were Justices
Sutherland, McReynolds, VanDevanter and Butler.)
12
Wilson v. New, 243 U. S. 332, 37 S. Ct. 298 (1917); Block v. Hirsh, 256
U. S. 135, 41 S. Ct. 458 (1921); Marcus Brown Holding Co. v. Feldman, 256
U. S. 170, 41 S. Ct. 465 (1921).
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essential to business in general, it would appear that a statute like
the one in Bradford v. Hargis might be upheld on the principles of
those cases permitting legislative regulation, in emergencies, of
businesses which are not otherwise so "affected with a public interest" as to permit legislative regulation.'
This proposition,
'f capably enough urged to the Supreme Court would probably
even be acceptable to those members constituting the majority in
Ribnik v. McBride."
-HENRY

P.

SNYDER.

CONTRACTS-ACCEPTANCE OF AN OFFER IN WHICH THE TiE

LImiTATION is AmBIGuous.-Cline, the owner of a tract of land,
wrote a letter dated January 29, 1929 to Caldwell, the owner of
another tract, offering to exchange his lands plus $6,000 for those
of Caldwell. The letter was sent from Valls Creek, West Virginia,
to Caldwell at Peterstown, West Virginia; Caldwell should have
received it on either the 29th or 30th, but did not actually receive
it until February 2. The letter, among other things, stated: "i
will give you 8 days to either except or reject this offer"; "I am
prepared within 8 days to make you same deeds"; and, further, "i
will not spent any more money on this deal and after 8 days it
will not be for sale for 90 days." Caldwell wired an acceptance
on February 8, which reached Cline on the 9th. In the meantime,
and after the expiration of what he considered to be the eight day
period, Cline had given an option on the land to a third party,
under which option the land was sold.
Caldwell, claiming that his acceptance created a binding contract, brought action to obtain specific performance thereof. The
Circuit Court sustained Cline's demurrer to the bill and dismissed
the action. Upon appeal therefrom, the West Virginia Supreme
Court of Appeals, in Caldwell v. Cline,' reversed the decree, rein'8 upra n. 12.
Mr. Justice Sutherland, speaking for the Court in Tyson & Bro., United
M
Theatre Ticket Offices v. Banton, 273 U. S. 418, 47 S. Ct. 426, at 430 (1926),
recognizes the validity of such legislation, citing and approving cases.
"This fact does not appear in the reported case, but was stated in defendant's answer in the Circuit Court, which was left out of the record by
agreement of counsel; and also in defendant's petition for rehearing; nor
was it denied, plaintiff having failed to allege in the bill of complaint that
defendant was the then owner of the premises.
2156 S. E. 55 (W. Va. 1931).
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